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SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION   
 
FDR AND OBAMA:  ARE THERE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
LESSONS FROM THE NEW DEAL FOR THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION? 
Craig L. Jackson 
It was the popular media that first made the comparison between 
an Obama presidency and that of Franklin Roosevelt.  The media did 
not wait until President Obama took office, but began the compari-
sons in earnest after the presidential election of 2008, perhaps most 
famously on Time Magazine’s November 24, 2008 cover depicting a 
photoshopped Barack Obama in a characteristic pose of the New 
Deal President along with an article titled “the New New Deal.”  Most 
of the comparisons had to do with the fallout from the economic 
near collapse of September 2008 amid reports of the second Great 
Depression and the expectation at that time of a legislative agenda 
suited for the present times, as the New Deal has been historically 
portrayed was for its times.1  And though FDR presided over a period 
of upheaval in national economics, his presidency also set the stage 
for a period of profound change in constitutional interpretation lead-
ing to a revolution in regulatory development which redefined the 
role of the state in American life.  This period was made all the more 
dramatic by the related conflicts between the Presidency, the Su-
preme Court, and the Congress.  The media may have had less of the 
latter on their minds when these comparisons were made, but as the 
Obama Administration progressed, it became apparent to constitu-
tional scholars that the regulatory developments in the areas of 
health care reform and financial regulation were creating some in-
 
 1 See Paul Krugman, Franklin Delano Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, at A29 (arguing that 
to achieve a success similar to the one enjoyed by the New Deal, President Obama needed 
to adopt a bold economic policy); Mark Green, 7 Days:  FDR = Obama?  Alter, Huffington, 
vanden Heuvel & Green Discuss and Compare Their Transitions, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 15, 
2008, 11:28 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-green/7-days-fdr-obama-alter-
hu_b_144058.html (discussing the respective transition strategies of Obama and Roose-
velt); George Packer, The New Liberalism:  How the economic crisis can help Obama redefine the 
Democrats, NEW YORKER, Nov. 17, 2008, available at http://www.newyorker.com/
reporting/2008/11/17/081117fa_fact_packer (arguing that times of economic crisis can 
allow Presidents to makeover their political parties and agendas). 
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teresting substantive interactions between the two periods, which in 
turn resulted in new interest in examining the constitutional devel-
opments of the New Deal era. 
The regulatory state as we know it began during the New Deal and 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is one of the most 
significant regulatory programs passed by Congress since the New 
Deal.  As a result of these obvious connections, and the constitutional 
theory underlying them, several scholars were invited to consider the 
two periods and comment on what they considered to be noteworthy 
constitutional developments connecting the administrations.  This 
symposium edition is the product of a conference of the same name, 
which was held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in Janu-
ary of 2012.  That event was preceded by a single panel presentation 
addressing the same issues at the Annual Meeting of the Southeast-
ern Association of Law Schools (“SEALS”) in the summer of 2011.  
This core panel, which was the basis for the larger symposium at the 
University of Pennsylvania, produced the scholarship presented in 
this edition.2 
A tacit recognition of the doctrinal legacy of the New Deal on pre-
sent day constitutional doctrine is evident in this scholarship, as each 
article engages the New Deal period in some way as part of the back-
drop for larger points of discussion.  The New Deal, Franklin Roose-
velt and the Democratic Congress’s legislative response to the Great 
Depression convened a period whose richness as a source of discus-
sion, argument, and analysis for constitutional law scholars has to do 
with the fact that several doctrinal strands came together during the 
period and underwent profound changes.  Most notable of these 
were the jurisprudence of the Commerce and the Due Process Claus-
es, and the federalism and separation of powers doctrines intertwined 
with these areas.  Frustrated with a court holding to principles of in-
terpretation thought to undermine New Deal legislation, President 
Roosevelt sought to add up to six new Justices to the Supreme Court 
for every justice over seventy in hopes of getting a Court more ideo-
logically attuned to his agenda.  Failing that, Roosevelt went on to 
appoint eight Justices to the Court in his second and third terms, ef-
 
 2 This is true with two exceptions.  This writer’s paper, The Limiting Principle Strategy and 
Challenges to the New Deal Commerce Clause, was not delivered at the SEALS meeting or the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School symposium and is being presented for the first 
time in this edition.  An article titled 1937 Redux?  Reflections On Constitutional Development 
And Political Structures by Professor Mark Tushnet, a member of the core panel at SEALS 
and the University of Pennsylvania Law School was published in Volume 14 of this Jour-
nal.  See Mark Tushnet, 1937 Redux?  Reflections On Constitutional Development And Political 
Structures, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1103 (2012). 
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fectively achieving the result that he sought through the ill-fated 
Court Packing Plan.  That result was a court willing to entertain 
broader understandings of key constitutional provisions, as well as the 
doctrines of federalism and separation of powers (key to the New 
Deal), and with that, set in motion the development the beginnings 
of the modern regulatory state. 
This writer’s article, The Limiting Principle Strategy and Challenges to 
the New Deal Commerce Clause, focuses on how the Court has defined 
Congressional power through the Commerce Clause.  The Supreme 
Court, beginning in 1937, has interpreted the Clause as a powerful 
and plenary power of Congress when rationally used and has de-
ferred to Congress on matters of federalism.  However since United 
States v. Lopez,3 the Court has sought to limit this power, and its 
Commerce Clause decisions have been weakest when the Court sub-
jectively develops limiting principles on Congressional authority 
without solid constitutional bases.  Broad and vague constitutional 
provisions such as the Tenth Amendment describe a policy but do 
not provide adequate specifics to justify the non-political branch im-
posing its conceptions of federalism on the legislature.  The econom-
ic activities principle in Lopez and United States v. Morrison4 is such an 
example.  The activities/non-activities dichotomy in National Federa-
tion ruling that the Commerce Clause did not authorize Congression-
al passage of the Individual Mandate is another such example of a 
subjective limiting principle. 
The present Court’s dilemma is that in seeking to arrest the ex-
pansive nature of the New Deal Commerce Clause, it is limited in the 
means to pursue limiting principles.  The old conservative Court had 
the specific language of the Commerce Clause—“among the several 
states”—to limit Congress’s power, and when it went beyond that to 
allow implementation beyond the specifics of the clause via the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, it limited Congress to channels and in-
strumentalities of commerce.  Decisions in 1937 and after expanded 
Congress’s authority much further by use of the Substantial Effects 
Doctrine and aggregation theory making Congress’s commercial au-
thority a general economic regulatory authority.  In doing so, the de-
cisions opened the door to the creation of the modern regulatory 
state with influence in economic and social policy to the extent the 
national economy was affected.  To return to the old conservative 
ways would mean rewriting the six decades of Court precedent prior 
 
 3 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 4 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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to Lopez.  Instead of such a drastic move, the present day court major-
ity chooses to impose its own view of the proper role of Congress vis-à-
vis the states over the judgment of Congress, and it has done so with 
subjective approaches to the federalism principles.  National Federa-
tion’s Commerce Clause ruling is the latest example. 
Professor Laura Cisneros is an associate professor of law at the 
Golden Gate University School of Law in San Francisco.  In her arti-
cle Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Signifi-
cance of Symbol, Professor Cisneros takes the single most dramatic po-
litical and legal moment in the New Deal era, Roosevelt’s Court 
Packing Plan, and examines how it has been used rhetorically in fed-
eral court decisions since then.  She notes that Dean Erwin 
Chermerinsky has argued that fuller understanding of Supreme 
Court decisions can be achieved by examining how the justices of the 
Supreme Court and judges on lower courts use rhetoric.5  With this in 
mind, Professor Cisneros identifies two kinds of messages in the use 
of the Court Packing Plan in decisions. 
Some references in federal cases have invoked the Court Packing 
Plan to warn of incursions into judicial independence.  Others have 
used the Plan to caution against judicial policy-making.  Both refer-
ences, worded differently to reflect the writer’s intent, demonstrate 
the “transformative power” of the event. 
Professor Cisneros continues in her essay to review the uses of the 
language “switch in time”—the reference to the legend of Justice 
Robert’s “change” of judicial philosophy following the announce-
ment of the Court Packing Plan.  She also reviews decisions where 
both references were used together.  Professor Cisneros says that the 
language of the Court Packing Plan as a rhetorical tool “has entered 
our culture of argument” over the role of the Courts in our govern-
mental system.6 
Professor Charlton Copeland is an associate professor of law at the 
University of Miami School of Law.  His article Beyond Separation in 
Federalism Enforcement:  Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of 
Engagement, is an examination of an alternative way of looking at fed-
eralism issues through the lens of the Court’s decision in National Fed-
eration7 on the Medicaid expansion provision of the Affordable Care 
Act.  Professor Copeland argues that the dominant paradigm for ex-
 
 5 Laura A. Cisneros, Transformative Properties of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan and the Significance of 
Symbol, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 63 n.12 (2012) (referencing Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2008, 2008 (2002)). 
 6 Id. at 90.  
 7 National Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB]. 
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amining federalism enforcement focuses primarily on the separation 
of authority between states and the federal government at the time of 
legislative enactment.  This approach ignores how implementation of 
legislative policy at both national and state levels involves cooperative 
federalism in cases involving federal Spending Clause legislation. 
Professor Copeland maintains that the decision of a majority of 
the Court invalidating part of the Medicaid expansion provision, on 
the basis that the provision amounted to coercion, was an opportuni-
ty missed.  He argues that the better way to evaluate federalism issues 
is to focus on how administrative law principles protect state interests 
and their role in implementation of legislative policy.  The coercion 
theory, rooted in Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, is an example of 
a truncated approach to federalism.  Professor Copeland gives other 
examples of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, demonstrating that 
case law’s reliance on separation as the exclusive mode of analysis.  
Professor Copeland’s discussion of the Medicaid program shows how 
actual administrative implementation of the program conflicts with 
the separation approach to federalism enforcement, and how that 
long established practice in Medicaid implementation could have in-
fluenced the Court in its analysis of the expansion.  Professor 
Copeland gives examples of other state-federal programs from the 
implementation point of view, suggesting that administrative law doc-
trine offers a more realistic means of evaluating the state-federal rela-
tionship. 
Professor Barry Cushman is the John P. Murphy Foundation Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Notre Dame.  Professor Cushman’s 
article is an extensive review of the book Supreme Power:  Franklin Roo-
sevelt vs. the Supreme Court8 by Jeff Shesol.  Shesol’s book has been re-
garded as not only a description of the politics and law of the three 
branches of government surrounding Roosevelt’s Court Packing 
Plan, but also as a subtle suggestion of similarities between Roose-
velt’s times and the present with hotly contested regulatory develop-
ments and a divided Supreme Court at both ends of the timeline.9  
Professor Cushman’s article examines Shesol’s book from three per-
spectives:  (1) Shesol’s treatment of the political story of the Court 
Packing Plan, (2) that episode’s legal story, and (3) how the two sto-
ries relate to each other.  Professor Cushman concludes that the book 
 
 8 JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER:  FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010). 
 9 Casey Greenfield, FDR’s Court Shenanigans, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2010, 7:42 PM) 
available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/04/13/fdrs-court-shenanigans.
html (noting parallels between Roosevelt’s difficulty in enacting New Deal programs and 
Obama’s attempts to pass healthcare reform). 
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is far more successful in addressing the political story than it is in ad-
dressing the remaining two perspectives. 
Professor Cushman describes the political story as “how to under-
stand the political trajectory of the Plan from its initial conceptualiza-
tion to its ultimate failure”10 and he credits Shesol’s “skillful render-
ing of the political story”11 as supporting the view the Plan was 
mishandled from the beginning at the announcement of the plan—
so much so that “[i]t was not unreasonable for the justices to doubt 
that their immediate, total, and unconditional surrender was neces-
sary in order to avert the threat of Court–packing.”12 
However, the article does not regard the book as being nearly as 
successful in its rendering of the legal story in large part because of 
inconsistent reflection on what Professor Cushman calls the internal 
story—how factors having to do with quality of constitutional argu-
ment, legislation, doctrinal developments over time, and the ap-
pointments process affected the posture of the Court both before 
and after the announcement of the Court Packing plan.13  Though he 
acknowledges that the book lays some groundwork validating an in-
ternal perspective—Professor Cushman faults Shesol’s willingness to 
resort to the factors external to legal craftsmanship—personalities of 
the Justices, the threat of the Court Packing Plan, and the magnitude 
of Roosevelt’s 1936 landslide victory—to describe the legal story.  Pro-
fessor Cushman argues that in the book’s perspective, “being a liberal 
or a conservative justice boiled down to selecting between two com-
peting theories of political economy in the service of two competing 
sets of interests”—laissez-faire economics and the welfare state.14  Pro-
fessor Cushman believes that resort to this paradigm in Shesol’s tell-
ing of the legal story, as well as the relationship between the legal and 
political stories, dilutes and negates much of Shesol’s recognition of 
the internal dimension to the developing interpretive process going 
on at the Court.15 
Professor Jamal Greene of Columbia Law School analyzes the liti-
gation strategy in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act case.16  Justifications 
for the Act’s Individual Mandate were based primarily on the authori-
 
 10 Barry Cushman, The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 184 (2012). 
 11 Id. at 209. 
 12 Id. at 210. 
 13 Id. at 205–07, 214–15. 
 14 Id. at 217. 
 15 Id. at 208. 
 16 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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ty of Congress to regulate interstate commerce under Article I of the 
Constitution,17 an argument based in large part on New Deal era 
precedents that expanded the reach of Congress’s power under that 
clause.  Professor Greene establishes in his article, What the New Deal 
Settled, that the strategy to attack Congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to pass the individual mandate is not demonstrably 
stronger than a strategy based on substantive due process—a strategy 
that was not pursued by the Act’s opponents.  Though the basis for 
legislative authority under both the Commerce and Due Process 
Clauses were expanded by New Deal era precedents, the opponents 
to the law, and to the individual mandate in particular, were willing 
to challenge the constitutionality of the law under the former but not 
the latter.  Professor Greene offers several critical assessments on this 
litigation strategy. 
Acknowledging the political component of the debate and litiga-
tion over the health care law, Professor Greene suggests three reasons 
for this strategy.  First, arguments based on due process would have 
drawn into question the constitutionality of the similar Massachusetts 
state level health care legislation signed into law by the Republican 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney when he was governor of that 
state.  In addition, that strategy, with its foundation in the liberty in-
terest component of due process theory, would have weakened the 
fragile coalition between libertarians and social conservatives in the 
Republican Party.  Finally, Professor Greene suggests a reluctance on 
the part of the mandate to “affiliate their arguments with the Court’s 
reproductive freedom precedents” which would be practically una-
voidable.18 
Professor Greene also argues that the absence of due process ar-
guments shows just how pervasive the aversion to the economic due 
process legacy of the Lochner decision is on constitutional thinking.  
Substantive due process arguments in economic cases can be distin-
guished from Lochner–style economic due process by articulating con-
stitutional principles based upon accepted rationales.  Yet Lochner’s 
disproportionate impact on constitutional theory stymies these argu-
ments. 
Within the scenarios played out during this period of constitu-
tional interpretive change was the principle of separation of powers.  
This produced an understanding between the Court and Congress on 
 
 17 See Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 17–20, Dep’t of Health & Hu-
man Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
 18 Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 267 (2012). 
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the role of deference by the Court to Congress based upon a pre-
sumption of constitutionality that the Court would accord legislation 
before it if the legislation were shown to be a rational exercise of 
Congressional authority.  Professor Louise Weinberg, the holder of 
the Bates Chair at the University of Texas School of Law, reminds us 
in her article, Unlikely Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, that 
part of this settlement, outlined in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.19 between the two branches, did not include legislation affecting 
constitutional rights.  Footnote four in that decision separated consti-
tutional rights from the new deferential settlement by establishing a 
rights-based tiered scrutiny approach based on interest analysis, in-
stead.  And though Carolene Products is celebrated as being the source 
of rights-based jurisprudence, Professor Weinberg demonstrates a 
heretofore unrecognized jurisprudential heritage of the concept oc-
curring in Court decisions earlier in the decade, most notably in the 
conflicts of laws area.  Professor Weinberg describes Carolene Products’ 
Footnote Four not only as “the beginning of the end of pre-modern 
constitutional thought” in the area of rights-based constitutional 
analysis, but in light of the earlier case precedent, “also the end of the 
beginnings.”20 
The principle that government must have at least a legitimate 
purpose to enforce its legislation is first observed in a 1930 conflict of 
laws case establishing that state legislation applies only to those trans-
actions with which the state had significant contacts creating state in-
terests.21  Similarly, that government must have a rational reason for 
its actions is first observed in an opinion written by Justice Stone,22 the 
author of Carolene Products.  In that case the Court agreed that Cali-
fornia’s interest in protecting its public assistance funds was a rational 
reason for its law requiring application of its workman’s compensa-
tion law for injured workers likely to domicile there.23  And though 
Erie v. Tompkins24 is not thought of as a due process decision, Profes-
sor Weinberg demonstrates that it reflects thinking that was develop-
ing prior to Carolene Products, recognizing state interests as being im-
portant in establishing state legislative, or in the case of Erie, state 
 
 19 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 20 Louise Weinberg, Unlikely Beginnings of Modern Constitutional Thought, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 291, 293 (2012). 
 21 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930). 
 22 Alaska Packers v. Indust. Acc. Comm’n of Calif., 294 U.S. 532, 543 (1935) (“As the state 
had the power to impose the liability in pursuance of state policy, it was a rational, and 
therefore a permissible, exercise of state power to prohibit any contract in evasion of it.”). 
 23 Id. at 549–50. 
 24 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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judicial authority, and is part of a clarifying movement focusing issues 
of federalism, due process, and commerce on the governmental in-
terests involved. 
CONCLUSION 
This symposium’s approach to the subject matter, and the topics 
of the articles, faces the obvious “elephant in the room,” the health 
care litigation, not by depicting it as a non-issue, but by treating it as 
one of many issues in what can be described as an ideological impasse 
on governance.  That impasse developed from doctrinal trends dur-
ing the New Deal, and has developed into an impasse perhaps over 
the last generation.  The topical treatments here emphasize a holistic 
view of how the modern regulatory state came into being, how it has 
been characterized, and how ideology has affected the articulation of 
constitutional standards, both now and at the beginning of the de-
bate in the late 1930s.  Though it turned out not to be the bellwether 
opinion many had hoped for, National Federation’s importance lies in 
laying bare the tensions between two quite different views of the Con-
stitution and national governance.  This symposium hopefully will 
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